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HEGEL, RECOGNITION AND RIGHTS: 
‘ANERkENNuNG’ AS A GRIDLINE Of THE 
PHILOSOPHy Of RIGHTS1
Jürgen Lawrenz2
AbstrAct: Although the locus classicus of the concept of recognition is the master/slave episode 
of the Phenomenology, it is readily portable into the Philosophy of  Right. However, the fact that the 
term occurs only six times in the 400 pages of the Philosophy of  Right has obscured its structural 
role, and accordingly scholarly effort is scant on the concept as it might pertain to this work. It 
is the argument of this paper that despite its ‘invisibility’ it governs foreground proceedings as 
if from behind a curtain, for it cannot be gainsaid that the conceptual foundation of the Rights 
presupposes the principle of recognition. The suspicion has been voiced that Hegel deliberately 
suppressed reminders of the presence of Anerkennung in his philosophy of rights in order to distance 
himself from the perceived limitations of the fichtean exposition of the concept. Accordingly 
this paper brings up the background of fichte and examines the Philosophy of  Right in its strategic 
dispositions to uncover the recognitive structure implied in it.
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The man accustomed to the ways of society is always outside himself and 
knows how to live only in the opinions of others. And it is, as it were, from 
their judgement alone that he draws the sentiment of his own existence. 
— Rousseau, Discourse on the Origins of  Inequality.
1. INTRODuCTION: THE HIDDEN ‘AGENT PROvOCATEuR’
Although the locus classicus of the concept of recognition is the master/slave episode 
of the Phenomenology, it would seem readily portable into the Philosophy of  Right (PR). 
     1. I am alluding here to the term Grundlinien in Hegel’s title, for which ‘Gridlines’ would be an unusual but 
feasible alternative to ‘Elements’. — Translations from German sources, whether Hegel, fichte or scholarly, 
are generally my own. See Hegel, G W. f., Grundlinien der Philosophie des Rechts, Leipzig, felix Meiner, 1930; 
Hegel, G. W. f., Elements of  the Philosophy of  Right, Allen Wood (ed.), trans. H. B. Nisbet, Cambridge, Cam-
bridge university Press, 1996 (henceforth PR); Also see Hegel, G. W. f., The Philosophy of  Right, trans. T. M. 
knox, New york, Oxford, 1980.
     2. I wish to express my thanks to Paul Redding of the university of Sydney for his careful reading of this 
paper in draught and for valuable suggestions on its improvement.
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However, the fact that the term occurs only six times in the pages of the PR seems to 
have obscured its structural role, and accordingly scholarly effort is scant on the concept 
as it might pertain to this work.3 yet an argument could be put that, despite its invisibility 
it governs foreground proceedings as if from behind a curtain, for it cannot be gainsaid 
that the conceptual foundation of the Rights presupposes the principle of recognition.
The plausibility of this suggestion is immediately apparent when, as early as the 
third paragraph of Part I, Abstract Right, we encounter the following passage:
Das Rechtsgebot ist daher: sei eine Person und respektiere die anderen als 
Personen (PR § 36).4
It is neither difficult nor illegitimate to the context to see in ‘respektiere’ here a synonym 
for ‘anerkenne’. And this invites us to contemplate a dilemma: for on the one hand one 
could quite readily trace out a recognitive structure in the PR—
The role of recognition in its various forms in the constitution of knowing and 
acting subjects … [is] developed most fully in the Philosophy of  Right. There in his 
treatment of the social institutions of modern life, the family, civil society and the 
state, Hegel sketches the sorts of epistemic and ethical competences that are found 
within these realms. 5
On the other hand the suspicion has been voiced that Hegel deliberately suppressed re-
minders of the presence of Anerkennung in his philosophy of rights:
Hegel persists with making claims on the figure of Anerkennung which was 
fundamental to the practical philosophy of the JPG [Jena Philosophy of  Spirit], while 
systematically pushing it into the background in the PR. In later portions of the 
PR we will encounter further intersubjective structures that give evidence of being 
incompletely derived in this manner.6
A plausible explanation for this state of affairs is offered by the fact that Hegel had long 
before writing the PR distanced himself from the liabilities of fichte’s system, which in 
many respects was his intellectual paternity; and Anerkennung was of course a celebrated 
fichtean coinage in the context of his work on Natural Right.7 However, in Hegel’s PR 
the principle had gained a great deal of philosophical substance; and in particular he took 
great care to ameliorate the deficiencies of argument in fichte’s presentation (see infra). 
for reasons best known to himself, however, Hegel chose the way of declining all asso-
ciation and thus covered up the tracks leading back to his erstwhile mentor.
     3. The presence of Anerkennung as an underlying principle of the PR has been completely neglected in 
the enormous bulk of Hegel scholarship until very recently—and even at the moment of this writing only 
Robert Williams, Hegel’s Ethics of  Recognition, Berkeley, university of California Press, 1997 and Paul Redding, 
Hegel’s Hermeneutics, Ithaca, Cornell university Press, 1996 have produced studies with a major segment on 
recognition in the PR at their focus.
     4. ‘The commandment of right is therefore: be a person and respect others as persons’.
     5. Redding, Hegel’s Hermeneutics, p. 17.
     6. Herbert Schnädelbach, Hegels praktische Philosophie, frankfurt/M, Suhrkamp 2000, p. 205.
     7. J. G. fichte, Grundlage des Naturrechts, in Sämmtliche Werke, Dritter Band. Berlin, veit und Comp., 1945.
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2. STARTING fROM fICHTE
yet the idea of Anerkennung is intrinsic to the concept of ‘rights’. The latter find their 
logical situation in the philosophy of agency in which they are embedded, e.g. ‘[the PR] 
is an agent-oriented or self-actualization theory, based on a conception of the human self to 
be exemplified or instantiated’.8 Moreover it makes little difference to this fundamental 
fact of human relations whether one’s orientation is legal or philosophical. A ‘right’ 
remains an empty concept unless it is allied with the recognition of  a person as the bearer of  
that right. ‘The validity and legitimacy of right are fundamentally a matter of the “We”, 
that is, of objective spirit’.9 In other words, it is of some importance to be mindful of the 
master/slave juxtaposition and distinguish the narrow conception of ‘rights’ that are its 
outcome there from broad base on which Hegel pursues it in the PR. Seen from the 
opposite angle, one may deny Anerkennung to any one as a person or as a legal entity, but 
in Hegel’s context this is tantamount to a diminution of the human spirit. Thus in his 
introductory remark to the PR,
Der Boden des Rechts ist überhaupt das Geistige … (PR § 4)10
the primary mode of recognition is identified. for although Anerkennung represents, in 
common with many human traits, simply a high development of analogous animal in-
stincts, the crucial enhancement is not a mere amplification, but its Vergeistigung.11
for fichte, as predecessor and trendsetter to Hegel in its conceptualization, it served 
the twofold function of establishing the domain of the will and the determination of 
the ‘I’ through its Anstoß (collision) with external objects, including other wills. The 
world which is the content of minds is formed by these interactions; but whereas objects 
merely resist, and in their resistance impose shape on the subjective world, other minds 
do this through complex intersubjective influences which demand on both sides the 
acknowledgement (Anerkennung) of innumerable social, intellectual, spiritual, emotional 
and material features in which humans in society are enveloped. Accordingly any pro-
posed code of rights must begin with the acknowledgement
that a rational creature cannot posit itself as such in full consciousness of itself, 
except by positing itself as an individual, as one among many rational creatures 
whose existence it accepts as much as it accepts its own.12
However, two aspects reverberate in the background to this statement. Individual free-
dom is, by natural and social circumstances, constrained; yet also, in this very constraint 
enhanced and enriched, for this is the nature and outcome of interrelations with other 
     8. Allen Wood, ‘Hegel’s Ethics’, in frederick Beiser (ed.), The Cambridge Companion to Hegel, Cambridge 
university Press, 1993, p. 217.
     9. Williams, Hegel’s Ethics of  Recognition, p. 111.
     10. ‘The basis of right is altogether in the spirit’.
     11. A bird entrenched in a corner of its territory issuing warning calls to others of its species not to infringe, 
a dog urinating on objects to leave its mark on them: these are as it were the instinctual benchmarks from 
which human recognition climbs up into the cognitive realm.




[though] only under the present presupposition that, if only one individual exists 
apart from myself, and only this one affects me, the initial condition—so to 
speak the root of my individuality—is not determined by my freedom, but by my 
connection with another rational being.13
As fichte remarks, this has repercussions for his whole theory of rights. What he calls 
the ‘external sphere’ of an individual—the penumbra of privacy which envelops the 
person in his public appearances—comprises the ‘space’ of decisions and choices; and 
now to remove this from the arbitrariness of individual relations, a public codification 
of rights suggests itself. Plainly the same applies to Hegel; and thus the following passus, 
although from fichte’s pen, is not foreign to the latter:
Limit your freedom by recourse to the concept of the freedom of all other persons 
with whom you come into contact.… I cannot but think of myself as a man among 
men in a society with whom nature has joined me; but I can scarcely do this 
without acknowledging the constraints of my freedom by their freedom.14
Another rational agent, or non-I in fichte’s terminology, therefore represents both 
challenge and invitation (Aufforderung) to the subject to manifest its causality.15 The goal 
is engagement in mutual self-projection and self-determination on the basis of mutu-
ally recognized freedom. Now the subject may resist or evade the challenge, but will 
ultimately have to declare his hand, for it emanates from and is addressed to a being 
capable of recognition who must respond, one way or another, because both parties are 
rational beings:16 Accordingly,
The relation between free agents in vis-a-vis is […] the relation of a mutuality of 
interaction based on intelligence and freedom. Neither can recognize the other, if 
they do not reciprocally recognize each other; and neither can treat the other as a 
free agent if both do not do the same.17
We find an echo of this in Hegel’s ‘Bei-sich-selbst-sein in einem Andern’ (being with 
oneself in Another, PR § 23), which in Wood’s words ‘does not limit but expresses my self 
… it is not a hindrance on me, but is in fact the very actualization of my freedom’.18
Philosophically, however, this is not as clear cut as these remarks make it appear. 
Echoes from Hobbes’ ‘brutish nature’ disturb fichte’s endeavours; for although in ac-
cordance with his declared intention he derives natural rights from the Wissenschaftslehre, 
his account of recognition amounts in the end to nothing more than a rational com-
mendation. In particular, ‘trust and faith’ (Treu und Glauben) are not enforceable; hence 
     13. J. G. fichte, The Science of  Ethics as Based on the Science of  Knowledge (Sittenlehre), trans. A. E. kroeger, 
London, kegan Paul, 1897, §18.
     14. fichte, Grundlage des Naturrechts, p. xii.
     15. fichte, Grundlage des Naturrechts, p. 24.
     16. fichte, Grundlage des Naturrechts, p. 28.
     17. fichte, Grundlage des Naturrechts, p. 37. — NB: It should be observed that in this same paragraph, fichte 
twice uses the term Erkenntnis as a cognitive act prior to Anerkennung.
     18. Wood, ‘Hegel’s Ethics’, p. 219.
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fichte needs to resort to a ‘law of compulsion’ (Zwangsgesetz) together with ID cards and 
related shenanigans.19 This makes it apparent that his arguments suffer from an inner 
contradiction: if trust is a dubious quantity, where has mutual recognition gone? As Wil-
liams writes,
fichte’s account of mutual recognition subverts itself because individuals remain 
external to each other in spite of their relationship. Thus community is either 
impossible or not genuine … the coercion argument undermines the ethical life 
that the recognition argument is supposed to generate.20
This is where Hegel fills the gaps in the picture. His account brings with it the insight 
that full intersubjective recognition changes the nature of  self-knowledge of  the subjects en-
gaged in this interaction and thereby rewrites the basic tenets of recognition itself. Thus 
Hegel’s account is not only philosophically richer but a full appropriation of recognition. 
This is exemplified in the phrase which, though it pertains to exchanges of property or 
competencies, permits extrapolation upon the whole of the PR, viz., the moment of rec-
ognition is already contained in and presupposed by it.
3. ANTI-ANERkENNuNG
Since it appears first in the PR, it is convenient to deal at once with the contrary 
of Anerkennung, namely its refusal. In the PR this leaps out at the very beginning, where 
Hegel dilates on the difficulties in Roman law of defining a human being: it was not 
possible to succeed with such a definition since slaves could not be included in it (PR, 
Introduction § 2).21
There is an apparent contradiction to § 21 in this on which ferrarin writes, ‘Slaves 
are not slaves because their humanity is not acknowledged, but because they do not 
think and know themselves as human’.22 One may easily refuse one’s consent to this in-
terpretation, since it is not qualified by a political or legal edge, but takes Hegel’s phrases 
at prima facie value. Surely any slaves in Athens or Rome, the united States or Tsarist 
Russia, knew full well of their humanness! The discrepancy can be resolved, however, 
by taking note of the fact that Hegel speaks of ‘the slave’ in the singular, as a universal. In 
any case, he finally confirms that slaves do possess an ‘absolute right’ to their freedom, 
even though the culture in which they live may not be conducive to its (legal) imple-
mentation (PR § 66A). The heart of this matter can therefore to be found in the context 
of domination, which Hegel defines as extrinsic, i.e. without impairing the ontological 
freedom of the person:
As a living thing a human being can certainly be subjugated, i.e. be brought under 
the power of another in his physical or otherwise extrinsic attributes; but the free 
will cannot per se be coerced (PR § 91).
     19. fichte, Grundlage des Naturrechts, p. 165.
     20. Williams, Hegel’s Ethics of  Recognition, p. 289.
     21. One of the few positive things with which Hegel credits Christianity is its disavowal of slavery, which 
was based on the preciousness of each individual soul to God.
     22. Alfredo ferrarin, Hegel and Aristotle, Cambridge university Press, 2001, p. 327.
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Accordingly, it is slavehood which contradicts the principle: not necessarily the person 
who feels comfortable with it as a way of life.
Hegel saw a related danger coming to the surface in his own age, with the effu-
siveness of romantic Schwärmerei and irony taking hold of belles lettres (already leaning 
into a nihilism that was still to come). His words, i.e. that ‘this manner of unmeditated 
consciousness and feeling promotes subjective, chancy and arbitrary knowledge to a 
principle’, were surely meant as a warning that thoughtless nature worship leads to the 
ruin of rights and recognition.23
Turning from slavery to criminality, non-recognition is a violation of humanness. As 
Wood aptly notes, in Hegel’s theory the commission of a crime entails the criminal’s 
consent to punishment: ‘When I commit a crime, my act revokes my own claim on the 
right that I violate, [for] by invading another’s sphere of freedom, I declare by my action 
that I no longer recognize that right as inviolable’.24
With this the criminal puts himself ‘in partibus infidelium’. A criminal act, like self-
willed slavery, is self-subverting: ‘The committing of an infringement of right as right 
may have a positive extrinsic existence, but it is null in itself ’; and being null, it cancels 
out the infringement (PR §§ 97-8); but after the rights of the situation are redressed, the 
punishment remains as the redressing of the legal issue. for Hegel, a criminal act is not 
primarily damage to or alienation of extrinsics, but an offence against the fundamentals 
of ethics, tantamount to assault on the person who embodies them. And punishment 
is unavoidable to prevent the act from inadvertently acquiring Anerkanntsein, or social 
acceptability.
It follows from these criteria that disposing of one’s external possessions is unprob-
lematic (PR § 65-7);25 my body and/or freedom, however, are another matter. ‘There 
is no statute of limitations on those rights which concern the essential nature of my 
self-consciousness, as well as my intrinsic personality and in general my freedom of 
will, ethical condition, religion’, writes Hegel (PR § 66). Thus, although voluntary acts 
of disposal (Entäußerung) like bondship and legal incompetence, but also superstition and 
powers of attorney, are relatively common, yet no other party can ever have a positive 
claim on them.
To end, an ironical aside from Hegel’s disquisitions on love and marriage. Anerken-
nung is the self-evident basis for this institution (cf. infra); its opposite is hidden between 
the lines of this passage:
Modern dramas and other artistic productions, however, where sexual love is the 
     23. It is surely significant that Hegel uses almost identical language in both paragraphs, viz. ‘ein gesteigertes 
Gefühl, die eigene Brust und die Begeisterung zur Quelle des Rechts [zu machen]’ (PR § 2) and ‘[die] das 
Denken ausschließen wollen und an das Gefühl, Herz und Brust, an die Begeisterung verweisen’ (PR § 
21). Is this type of behaviour, which ‘rob[s] mankind of all truth, value and dignity’ not the consummate 
exhibition of self-willed slavery of spirit?
     24. Wood, ‘Hegel’s Ethics’, p. 114.
     25. Externals may include my labour, skills and even those mental qualities which I see fit to put at 
another’s service—but always and ever for a limited period of time and never to the point of completely 
surrendering what is constitutive of my spiritual integrity (§ 67).
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main attraction, put us in touch with a pervasive frigidity factor which is infused 
into the heat of the passions being portrayed by the utter fortuitousness associated 
with all this; and the whole interest is thought to rest only on these—which may 
well be of infinite importance to them, but hardly in itself (PR § 162).26
The point of bringing this up is that Anerkennung can play no role here: it is pure in-
dulgence, a false relation between consciousnesses, a conflagration rather than a meeting 
of minds.
4. LOvE AND MARRIAGE
Recognition forms the bedrock of the estate of ‘marriage’. Its substantiality is the 
unity imparted by love; the individual is subsumed as a member; and the overt unity of 
natural sexes transforms itself into a union of the spirit (PR §§ 158 & 161).27 Concomitantly 
the legal form this takes is characterized by treating the union as a kind of corporate 
entity: the individual is a legal person only where he/she must be detached (abgesondert) 
from the family unit.28
Given the temper of his times—as a contemporary of the romantic generation in 
the wake of Herder—it is not perhaps surprising that love was important to him in a 
way it could never be to, say, Descartes or kant. ‘[It] is both a speculative ontological 
principle and an account of intersubjectivity’, Williams writes, adding that its effect is 
the diminution of distance, separation and alienation between self and other by way of 
‘depriving the other of its foreign or alien character’.29 Recognition in both the biblical 
and Hegelian sense; even though the somewhat patronizing biblical ‘companionship’ is 
here replaced by the ‘I’ becoming a ‘We’.
However, Hegel’s position retains traces of patriarchalism in that he allows only ‘the 
reality of the species’ as constitutive of the ethical relationship of marriage. Today de 
facto marriage is legally acceptable; not for Hegel, whose ethical baseline of the ‘objec-
tive determination and therefore ethical duty’ entails a commitment of the partners to 
enter into a socially and legally formalized state of marriage (PR §§ 160-2). Natural drives 
are sated by being removed from the condition of chance encounters; but as the Remark 
to this point adds (PR §§ 160-2), the principle which justifies marriage is the dissolution 
of singleness and its replacement by the ‘family as a person’ whose members are now its 
     26. Nisbet and knox in their translations give us ‘these particular individuals’; but there are no individuals 
in Hegel’s text. It appears they were looking for a subject of the statement and missed Leidenschaft and 
Zufälligkeit as the two symptoms of modernity (i.e. the these and them) which incur Hegel’s displeasure. 
     27. I stress ‘natural’, for Hegel’s exclusive concern is with man/woman relation ships. As §163 makes clear, 
he would hardly condone the relationship between a pubescent male and his mature mentor extolled in 
Plato (Symposion); for Hegel this and the monkish habits familiar to Christian culture are aberrations from 
the ‘natural vivacity’ of love.
     28. Where that person does not act as a representative of the family, but selbstherrlich. This does not 
impair the competence of the male to enact administrative decisions and also covers situations of dissolution 
(divorce, majority of children) (PR § 159).
     29. Williams, Hegel’s Ethics, p. 208.
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accidentiae.30
It is interesting, now, that Hegel is disinclined to consent to the mere external signs 
of such a union, whether sanctified by church or civil authorities, as truly constitutive. 
for example, chastity is valueless if imposed, for it does not then arise from a conscious 
acknowledgement of its ethical inevitability and An erkennung has little chance for being 
realized in the relationship. But to be One is to occupy the geistige Boden; (PR § 166) and 
therefore the recognition which is basic to the partnership finds its natural complement 
in the Anerkennung (acknowledgement) by society that this union is sanctified by its laws 
and customs and therefore inviolate in principle.31 How this covers the property and 
means of subsistence of the union is adumbrated in §§ 169-72.
The upbringing of children brings an intriguing aspect of recognition to the fore. 
It is after all the desire of parents to give their children a good start in life; and this 
entails passing on the recognitive structure which governs relationships within society. 
It involves parents seeking recognition first for themselves as parents, then for their children 
by appropriate upbringing, and simultaneously by positioning themselves where social 
benefits are the declared ‘investment outcome’. Thereby the children, when they leave 
the nest, will find themselves embraced by the recognitive environment on the strength 
of efforts not their own, and which they will seek to replicate (or improve) when their 
turn at parenting comes.
As an appendix to the foregoing, it is to be noted that Hegel explicitly invokes 
Anerkennung in respect of the children when they attain majority (PR § 177). Indeed, their 
right to this acknowledgement is laid into their cradle, since in conformity with Hegel’s 
overall philosophy, ‘Children are free per se … they belong neither to their parents nor 
to anyone else as property (objects, items, Sachen)’ (PR § 175).
Equally interesting are the recognitive criteria applicable to inheritance. Hegel stems 
     30. feminists are unlikely to concur with Hegel’s provisions of §166 and put them down to the prejudice 
of patriarchalism. And indeed the needs of which Hegel speaks are plainly male oriented on biological and 
anthropological criteria, which have in recent times been levelled out by technological advances, relieving 
women of many constraints of their biological natures. But technology cannot change their genetic profile; 
and in this respect some feminist commentators are inclined to concede to Hegel an important point, 
namely (as Wood notes in ‘Hegel’s Ethics’, p. 245) that ‘woman orders things according to her feelings and 
thus govern [the family] in a genuine sense, deriving what should happen from her individuality’; and as 
Williams point out, ‘contemporary views concerning women’s distinctive moral capacities [are shared by] 
Carol Gilligan and Sarah Ruddick’`Williams, Hegel’s Ethics of  Recognition, p. 222 with references). The upshot 
is that Hegel’s insistence on the complementarity of men’s and women’s capacities may have philosophical 
virtues that are lost on certain mores of contemporary society.
     31. Pursuant to § 167, such Anerkennung can only be validly enacted in a monogamy. Polygamy and the ‘free’ 
love relationships nowadays endorsed cannot realize the appropriate ethical criteria. As Williams, Hegel’s 
Ethics of  Recognition, p. 223 points out, ‘Polygamy remains on the pre-ethical level; it does not break with 
nature or natural determinations, but is an extension of natural inequality’. — A more difficult issue, touched 
upon in § 168, of love relations between partners in close consanguinity, is as not convincingly resolved and 
one fails to see the point where they leave the Boden des Geistigen. This issue cannot be further pursued 
here beyond quoting Jurist, who writes that ‘Hegel’s claim that the brother-sister relation is removed from 
natural desire … sounds dubious to post-freudian ears’. Elliot Jurist, Beyond Hegel and Nietzsche: Philosophy, 
Culture and Agency, Cambridge, MIT Press, 2000, p. 171.
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himself against alienation of family property due to death: while the family (or extended 
family) persists, no property may be described as herrenlos. Moreover, testamentary dis-
positions based on Willkür incur his censure, for in such cases Anerkennung of external 
services only succeeds in damaging the ethical basis of the family and encourage base-
ness (Niedertracht) by parties with self-serving interests: it is therefore a false, irresponsible 
recognition.32
In sum, what is depicted in the love-and-family scenario of these sections is the three-
fold aspect of recognition in the PR which reflects the division proposed by Honneth 
into Primärbeziehungen (love), Rechtsverhältnisse (rights) and Wertgemeinschaft (solidarity).33 
Honneth’s remarks may be digested here for the light they throw on Anerkennung in each 
facet of its tripartite structure. He sees trust (Vertrauen) as central to love, whether between 
the sexes or grown-ups and children. Legal recognition, on the other hand, obviously 
excludes affectivity, for it represents the ‘purely cognitive capacity of understanding’;34 
while finally solidarity, which exceeds mere ‘passive tolerance’ of the others ideally rises 
to Selbstschätzung, or the integrity of communal self-regard.35 We may take these few 
comments as providing a bridge to the consideration of other features of Anerkennung in 
Hegel’s philosophy of right.
5. PERSONAL INTEREST AND ITS REfLECTION IN OTHERS
The preceding discussion suggests a logical structure being built, a kind of scaffold-
ing with three major arms on which the filial, civic and judicative ‘realizations’ of the 
objective will find their place as well as their cross linkages. If now we recall the Boden des 
Geistigen as the fundamental tenet, then Hegel’s remarks in the ‘Transition from Property 
to Contract’ reveal themselves as their complement:
Dasein as determinate being is essentially being with purpose.36 Property, to the 
extent that Dasein is extrinsic to it, is for other externals and to the degree of 
their mutual connectedness, necessity and contingency. But as Dasein of the will,  
[property] exists as an intentional object only for the will of another person. This 
relation of will to will is the peculiar and bona fide ground on which freedom has 
its existence (PR § 71).37
Interestingly Hegel has no compunction in allowing self-interest being mediated by its 
     32. Hegel effectively says that no part of the family Vermögen may be alienated (given away) by a member 
of the family by a testamentary disposition. cf. PR § 178-9.
     33. Axel Honneth, Kampf  um Anerkennung, frankfurt/M, Suhrkamp verlag, 1992, p. 154ff.
     34. Honneth, Kampf  um Anerkennung, p. 178.
     35. Honneth, Kampf  um Anerkennung, p. 210.
     36. Nisbet translates ‘being for another’. This is unfortunate, for the reader must wonder how it dovetails 
with the immediately ensuing Eigentum, and how it fits into the context of Hegel’s cross-reference to § 48. 
The cause, one suspects, was mistaking anderes for andere; but the former does not normally refer to persons 
but to things, events, circumstances or, in this passage, to purposes.
     37. Hegel’s diction here is pretty gnarled and has confused readers. The pronoun ‘dieser’ seems like a lost 
waif looking for its parents. Who are they? Solution: Eigentum and Äußerlichkeiten. Thus the skeleton of the 
sentence is ‘property is for externals their necessity and contingency’.
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absorption into the universal recognition on which the state must be reared. He calls it 
‘convenience’, explaining,
Owing to the fact that I must oblige others, the form of universality enters the 
picture. I acquire from others the means by which to satisfy my wants and must 
accordingly take note their views. But at the same time I am obliged to provide 
the means for satisfaction of their wants. So, one hand washing the other, all are 
linked together; and to this extent particulars acquire a social character (PR § 192 
A).
Civil life relies on this mutuality of conveniences for its normativity. Recognition is 
here little more than an acknowledgement that mutuality is its cardinal feature, though 
Hegel identifies a flaw in this limited view. for normativity presumes on the automatic 
conferral of opportunity on everyone to enter the goods-and-services percolator. The 
fact is, that some individuals play this game better than others and so it could happen 
(as in fact it does) that the needs of some members are not satisfied. for Hegel this is 
an unacceptable state of affairs, which he blames to some extent on the social contract 
model. What is wrong with the latter is the choice of a deficient ethical standard:
Ethical life is not abstract like the good life, but actual in the most intensive sense. 
… Accordingly only two points of view can possibly pertain to the ethical life, 
namely that we assume its substantiality and proceed from there, or else deal with 
it atomistically, building up from a base of particulars. The latter point of view is 
vapid, because it amounts to mere aggregation; but the spirit is not a particular 
… (PR § 156 A).
The ‘atom’ which finds his disfavour is the Cartesian cogito, whose self-suffi ciency stands 
in the way of the desired transition to recognition; therefore, in Williams’ words, ‘they 
only reach the concept of the state as a social contract between autonomous individuals 
who remain independent’.38 The spirit is not essential to such a transaction and conse-
quently remains unnoticed. But it is crucial for Hegel’s philosophy, as already noted, that 
not only should the ethical life facilitate the ‘I’ becoming a ‘We’, but that the singular will 
is overcome so as to fulfil itself in the process of a recognition which is at the same time 
a self-recognition. It is from this point of view that Hegel’s critique of Rousseau acquires its 
persuasive force:39
The misunderstanding of the general will begins when freedom is understood as 
the contingent arbitrary will of each individual. On the contrary, freedom must be 
taken in the sense of the rational will, the will in and for itself. The general will is 
not to be regarded as a collection of expressed individual wills, in which the latter 
remain absolute.
As Williams very pertinently notes, the individual will remains as it was before amal-
gamation. Geist remains an unwanted stranger to this scenario; the particular will has no 
avenue towards transformation, whereas the ‘general will’ as vested in either an author-
     38. Williams, Hegel’s Ethics of  Recognition, p. 265.
     39. I quote here from History of  Philosophy in the rendering given by Williams, Hegel’s Ethics of  Recognition, 
p. 277.
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ity or a champion, supposedly a universal, remains simply a transmogrified particular.
Contractual relations, according to Hegel, suffer greatly from a misunderstanding 
of what transpires in their execution, namely that they are grounded in the notion of an 
absolute equivalence between property and contract:
Contracts presuppose from the contracting parties the recognition of each other as 
persons and proprietors. Since it is a relationship of the objective spirit, the motive 
of recognition is already contained in it and presupposed (PR § 71).
The explicit naming of Anerkennung together with Hegel’s stress on the ‘will’ in § 71 is 
clearly designed to show that, in contradistinction to the attitude of the Lockean tradi-
tion, property is not a thing, but my will vested in the thing, in acknowledgement of which 
another party must be prepared to offer an appropriate inducement for me to surrender 
my interest. This interest in belongings is frequently indicated physically by a mark on 
them—a kind of personal signature impressed on it which represents my ‘spirit’ in the 
object (e.g. a trademark or even just a coat of paint) (PR § 58). This is a practice as old 
as society itself and has sound reasoning behind it:
Simply grasping and holding an object is not an adequate example of freedom, 
because it does not achieve its aim, which includes stability of holding (§45). Mere 
seizure of things doesn’t prohibit others from making off with one’s holdings. 
Possession is distinguished from mere holding by others’ recognition that one 
possesses something (PR § 51).40
So Hegel’s point in writing, ‘the concept of a mark is this, that the matter should not 
pass for what it is, but what it gives to understand’ (PR § 51 A italics added), is that the mark 
identifies someone, it has a content which points beyond itself to an intention. Accordingly 
the point of leaving my mark on my property is to elicit from others the recognition of 
my interest vested therein.
Nevertheless, the economic realities which pertain to society tend in recent times 
to obscure persons and frequently to refer to corporations rather than owners. Even so 
their prevalence indicates a reluctance to let go of a convenient anthropomorphism. 
What is often called ‘brand loyalty’ would seem to Hegel an especially pernicious mis-
use of the idea of intentionality, for in innumerable cases such brands serve merely to 
disguise the complete anonymity of the ‘owner’. Hence today’s economic agent must 
learn to depersonalize ‘desire’, or, as Paul Redding puts it, ‘[to] see desire from a type of 
“third person” or quasi-naturalistic point of view’. This implies that ‘each producer … 
[confronts] the will of a generalized other, a will with no fixed characteristics but which 
is always subject to unpredictable fluctuation and change. We might say that here the 
market is master’.41
Of course ‘the market’ of this phrase indicates simply another anonymous feature of 
present-day society—a kind of ‘Ersatz’ recognition to cover up the suppression of Geist 
     40. kenneth Westphal, ‘The Basic Context and Structure of Hegel’s Philosophy of  Right’, in frederick Beiser 
(ed.), The Cambridge Companion to Hegel, Cambridge university Press, 1993, pp. 234-269, p. 248. cf. also PR 
§§ 71-4.
     41. Redding, Hegel’s Hermeneutics, p. 201.
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in favour of ‘the economy’.
6. ANERKENNuNG INSTITuTIONALIzED
The state itself has a recognitive structure: for in the same respect as ‘rights’ cannot 
exist in themselves, neither can states have existence in abstracto. The state can be said 
indeed to represent the apotheosis of  recognition in both its negative and positive connota-
tions.
Institutions and authorities extend the domain of private and civil recognition to the 
whole of society. Indeed it is scarcely too much to say that their very existence in a state 
is predicated on the need to recognize the need for unilateral recognition. When Hegel 
states in § 188 that their office is ‘care for the particular interest as a common interest’, 
this reflects nothing more (nor less) than a recognition by the collective which empow-
ers those authorities that innumerable private interests are the same across the board; 
and conversely it is recognition on the part of institutions of the rights of citizens to be 
acknowledged in their interests.
As Hardimon correctly depicts it, those functions embrace legal recognition as a 
formal mechanism for the protection of individuality; the vouchsafing of social rights 
of individuals even against the power of institutions; and (not to be underestimated) the 
right to public welfare for those who are legitimately to be considered unable to fend 
for themselves.42 Hegel accepts from Locke the fundamental liberal recognition criterion of 
the right to ‘life, liberty and property’ and to unhampered economic activity.43 Another 
vital element of institutionalized recognition is the freedom of citizens to form guilds, 
clubs, unions and commercial, religious and political associations which are then to be 
treated as corporate bodies and recognized as a kind of ‘second family’ (PR § 252). In an 
interesting passage, Hegel points out that individual membership implies the possession 
of a capability which on the strength of having been admitted need not thereafter be 
demonstrated—it is socially recognized on the strength of having already been institutionally 
recognized (PR § 253). And this entails that this individual is somebody; being in possession 
of a socially recognized persona he has acquired honour in his estate (Standesehre).44
An honourable social station is not in this context a question of ‘great’ or ‘small’, nor 
of hereditary honour, but of Anerkennung which will neither disparage nor seem over-
weening. In part this reflects the criterion of Bildung that is so important to Hegel’s social 
theory. Its principal role is to cultivate the bases of  recognition in facilitating the individual’s 
     42. cf. Michael Hardimon, Hegel’s Social Philosophy: The Project of  Reconciliation, Cambridge university Press, 
1994, pp. 196-7.
     43. John Locke, The Second Treatise of  Government: An Essay Concerning the True Original, Extent and End of  Civil 
Government, J. W. Gough (ed.), 3rd ed., Oxford, Blackwell, 1966, § 87.
     44. The italics are Hegel’s. — Since constraints of space disallow the expansion of this discussion, I wish 
at this point merely to draw attention to the fact that honour is a prima facie instance of recognition, initially 
growing out of the master/slave situation but in the PR institutionalized in the manner above. The honour of 
being a person of competence in a socially useful profession means that the spread of recognition into lower 
strata of society draws these members into the larger net of societal recognition; it provides (as it were) a 
socially harmless and useful competitive basis for growth.
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actuality by giving him entry into determinate particularity (PR § 197 and 207); though 
evidently the acquisition of this ‘actuality’ also entails specific recognition by the com-
munity that Stände are integral to a society’s self-definition.
This mutuality between private and common recognition is complemented by an-
other feature. Since for Hegel all these criteria revolve around the central concept of a 
teleology of the Geist in society, it stands to reason that he will find in the commonality 
which characterizes corporate activity an exemplification of the same. So there is excel-
lent point in Hardimon’s observation that 
corporations have another crucial function: that of expanding the ability of members 
of society to identify with others … one comes to see one’s fellow members as 
sharing one’s trade, outlook and way of life. And one’s sense of connection, loyalty 
and camaraderie is enhanced … Indeed, in Hegel’s view, one of the reasons that 
corporations assign this task to their members is precisely to help them recognize 
that they are pursuing a common end and share a common project.45
The poor and deprived, inconveniences for society and often disparaged, have their 
own claims for recognition. Although Hegel frequently employs the term Pöbel (rabble) 
for them, this is less a reflection of his disapproval in principle, than a recognition of the 
inevitable outcome of societal neglect.46 By the same token, he evinces a great deal of 
concern over their presence in his rational state—an issue to which Wood devotes some 
attention.47
Essentially the nature of the problem is an inadvertently one-sided claim to recog-
nition whose outcome is, paradoxically, a matching one-sided claim at the opposite 
extreme, the over-affluent class. But while the latter’s claims subvert recognition in a 
concentration of wealth that endangers the maintenance of society (PR §§ 245-6), the 
poor constitute a reminder that a state is to be reckoned a failure so long as this class is 
isolated from the fulfilment of the objective spirit. Two passages from Hegel’s Vorlesungen 
are worth quoting in this context:
The rabble is the greediest after its rights, always hammering away at civil society’s 
obligation to maintain it.… The rabble is distinct from poverty; usually it is poor, 
but there are also rich rabble.48
In such a society ‘the recognition of universal freedom disappears’.49 Accordingly 
it devolves upon the civil institutions to restitute the damage, if necessary by Vormund-
schaft (PR §§ 239-40)— but with such considerations we enter a wasps’ nest of conflicts 
between rights and ideology that seems to provide no settled basis for an objective solu-
tion. Wood’s critical remarks suggest that ‘if civil society systematically produces a class 
whose existence violates [the principle of equal rights], then that tends to undermine the 
     45. Hardimon, Hegel’s Social Philosophy, p. 200.
     46. Interestingly this word derives from the Latin populus and was germanized by none other than Martin 
Luther, not with pejorative intent! Hegel’s usage reflects rather the Greek equivalent of an ochlocracy. 
Schnädelbach, Hegels praktische Philosophie, p. 365.
     47. Wood, ‘Hegel’s Ethics’, pp. 252-55. 
     48. vPR 4: 608-9, quoted by Wood, ‘Hegel’s Ethics’, p. 252.
     49. vPR 19:195, quoted by Wood, ‘Hegel’s Ethics’, p. 252.
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rationality of the ethical order as a whole’.50 But although he makes a persuasive case, it 
does not issue in an unequivocal conclusion that this is where Hegel’s construction falls 
apart.
7. fuNCTION Of THE HEAD Of STATE
Two further instances of recognitive structure where, perhaps, one might not expect 
them, may end this discussion.
Hegel was much in favour of constitutional monarchy. There is good reason for 
this from the tenets of his political philosophy. He had to face ‘the difficulty of finding a 
place for the recognition of each individual in his singularity’.51 He found it in the role of 
a monarch whose function is little more than to ‘sign his name’ on legislation submitted 
to him (PR § 279A). This name is the crucial piece of data:
The subjective position of the king is required for the very conceptual coherence 
of the state qua act of collective self-positing … grasping this in terms of the 
purely affective dimension of its functioning is to see these recognitive relations on 
the model of the family and to assume as normative the patriarchal state … an 
act can only be recognized as an act of willing if it is enacted through a singular 
subject. The king’s ‘I will’ is a singular act within which citizens can recognize a 
human intention as such. It gives singular form to the universality of the content 
and provides an address within which each citizen can recognize himself as that 
singular being who is addressed.52
Similar arguments serve for the recognition of a judge’s pronouncements ex cathedra in 
conformity with the intentions of the law. The difference to the head of state who wears 
a crown to the judge who wears a gown might not weigh so heavily in terms of their 
respective responsibilities, but the accoutrement of the latter denotes that the law is 
embodied in a person drawn from within the texture of society who will return to it after 
their term of office expires. Therefore both plaintiff and accused bring into the court-
room the operative level on which society functions (which would not be the case were 
they invited to attend a royal audition). Accordingly,
in the pronouncement of a judge I recognize myself as a particular bearer of rights 
on a par with all the others, but in the utterances of that person, the monarch, I 
recognize myself in my peculiar determination as this person who I alone am.53
CONCLuSION
Recognition is pervasive in the PR—a fact not obscured by the ‘concealment’ of 
     50. Wood, ‘Hegel’s Ethics’, p. 255.
     51. Redding, Hegel’s Hermeneutics, p. 229.
     52. Redding, Hegel’s Hermeneutics, p. 230.
     53. Redding, Hegel’s Hermeneutics, p. 231. NB: Perhaps an indifferent point—but the term ‘monarch’ does 
not sit well with this head of state—he is not a sole ruler. ‘king’ on the other hand is unexceptional: after all, 
the German kings and emperors held their office for centuries as primus inter pares, as elective kings.
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the term in Hegel’s text. for its underlying premise in the question, ‘what is the source 
of rights?’ has only one answer, that rights are attributes of  persons and that persons are indi-
viduations of  Geist. On the positive side, this conception of rights in the PR is a genuine 
reorientation from the iteration throughout history of variations on the slogan ‘right 
is might’. It is not hard to agree to Hegel’s proposition that the latter has impeded the 
development of freedom across the political history of all mankind.
Accordingly Hegel’s recognitive philosophy entails a conception of rights and law 
which emphasizes their growth from the bottom up, from the rights of  persons, instead of 
down from the top of the power echelon or where (as in the Lockean tradition) the law is 
enshrined in isolated splendour and indifferent to persons altogether. In Hegel’s philoso-
phy the state is the theatre where rights and recognition are compresent unilaterally.
It is arguable that its effect on the redefinition of personal and familial relations, 
business and trade, property, institutions and authorities is that of a humanization of these 
traditional mechanisms of power. His state may be described as an educative project, de-
signed to overcome the subjective concept of freedom by its conversion into objective Geist 
through the dialectical resolution of the ‘I’ and ‘you’ into the ‘We’. It is true that along 
the way, some blemishes make themselves manifest—but it may be conceded to Hegel 
that these are correctable details which do not impair the overall structure of Anerkennung.
The actualization of the objective Geist and human freedom in the state represents 
the essential non-negotiable value he puts forth. If we contrast Hegel’s state with those of, 
say, Plato or Hobbes, we note at once a crucial difference to which the concept of recog-
nition offers the key. A sense of subjective freedom is native to all human beings; it serves 
Hegel as the lever for putting the rational-recognitive faculty at the centre of political 
philosophy. Therefore freedom as a fruit of the objective spirit, which is unattainable in 
both Plato’s and Hobbes’ state, is under Hegel’s criteria achievable. for the power to 
implement it, and the rational faculties required, are given. Moreover the philosophical 
power of the Anerkennung doctrine as embedded in the PR accounts with rare insight for 
the human condition altogether, so that one may, without exaggeration, look upon it 
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